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P u b l i c OV E R S I G H T B o a r d
Annual
Report
1995-1996
 POB  
A b o u t  t h e
S E C  P r a c t i c e  S e c t i o n  a n d  t h e  P u b l i c  O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d
The  SECPS ___________________________________________________________
The SEC Practice Section ("SECPS" or the "Section") was founded in 1977 as part of the 
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") 
and its activities are overseen by the Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "POB"). 
The Section imposes membership requirements and administers a number of programs to 
help insure that SEC clients are audited by member accounting firms with adequate 
quality control systems. Member firms are required to participate in (1) peer review, 
through which Section members have their practices reviewed every three years by other 
accountants and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allegations of audit failure 
contained in litigation filed against member firms relating to SEC clients and certain other 
entities to determine if the firms' quality control systems require revision or there should 
be stricter compliance with the firms' quality control policies and procedures and/or the 
Section's membership requirements.
The requirements of the SECPS 
affect more than 112,608 
professionals at 1,300 member 
firms that audit more than 
14,869 SEC clients.
The  POB
The POB is an autonomous 
body of five members with a 
broad spectrum of business, 
professional, regulatory and 
legislative experience. The 
Board's independence is 
assured by its power to 
appoint its own members, 
chairperson and staff, set its 
own budget, and establish its 
own operating procedures. It 
oversees all SECPS activities.
The Board's primary 
responsibility is to represent 
the public interest (1) when the 
Section sets, revises or enforces 
standards, membership 
requirements, rules or 
procedures and (2) when 
SECPS committees consider the 
results of individual peer
reviews or the possible quality 
control implications of 
litigation alleging audit failure. 
The Board believes its 
responsibilities also include the 
monitoring of all matters and 
developments that may affect 
public confidence in the 
integrity of the audit process. 
The 1995 Annual Report of the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") 
acknowledges that the POB's 
activities have not been limited 
to oversight of the profession's 
self-regulatory programs but 
also are directed to improving 
the financial reporting process.
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e
A p p r o a c h  to I m p r o v e d
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
During 1995, the Board 
prepared and distributed a 
summary report of one of the 
key recommendations 
contained in the report of the 
Board's Advisory Panel on
Auditor Independence entitled 
Strengthening the Professionalism 
of the Independent Auditor. That 
summary, Directors, 
Management, and Auditors— 
Allies in Protecting Shareholder 
Interests, urges adoption of a 
corporate governance 
approach to improve financial 
reporting and has been widely 
distributed to over 50,000 chief 
executive and financial officers 
and directors of public 
companies. The centerpiece of 
this approach is enhanced 
communication, particularly 
between the auditors and the 
board of directors. In that 
regard, the report urges 
corporate boards and the 
independent auditor to engage 
in candid communication 
about the appropriateness, not 
just acceptability, of accounting 
principles and estimates and 
the clarity of the related 
disclosures of financial 
information.
The Board is considering 
other ways to encourage 
further acceptance and 
implementation of the 
corporate governance 
recommendation among those 
who have the responsibility for 
corporate governance. The 
Board strongly believes that a 
close relationship between the 
auditor and the board of 
directors/audit committee will 
enhance the ability of directors 
to discharge their critically 
important corporate 
governance responsibilities 
related to financial reporting 
while at the same time 
strengthening auditor 
professionalism and 
independence.
The SEC Practice Section 
has endorsed the recommenda­
tion for enhanced communica­
tion. A task force of the Peer 
Review Committee has been 
formed to identify "best 
practices" that SECPS firms 
have adopted to accomplish 
the objective of more candid 
communication between the 
auditor and the board. It has 
requested information from the 
firms of the members of the 
Peer Review Committee and 
has designed a survey 
questionnaire that has been 
used to compile information 
about implementation on the 
SEC engagements that are 
subjected to review in the 1996 
peer reviews of firms with five 
or more such engagements.
The results will be summarized 
with a view to communicating 
best practices to all SECPS 
firms.
GAO R e p o r t  on the
A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f e s s i o n
In September 1996 the General 
Accounting Office ("GAO"), in 
response to a congressional 
request, published a study of 
the manner in which the 
accounting profession had 
responded to recommenda­
tions of various bodies, 
entitled The Accounting 
Profession—Major Issues: 
Progress and Concerns. While 
identifying continuing 
problems such as indepen­
dence and the detection of 
fraud, the GAO generally 
found that the profession had 
responded well to the 
recommendations that were 
made. The POB was consulted 
by the GAO in the course of 
preparing the report and the 
POB submitted written
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comments in response to the 
exposure draft. The report 
commended the SECPS and the 
POB for their work in 
strengthening the audit process 
and took particular note of the 
Board sponsored report of the 
Advisory Panel on Auditor 
Independence.
L i t i g a t i o n  Re f o r m
The Board supported the 
efforts of the profession to 
persuade Congress to adopt 
legislation which would 
substitute, for the long­
standing principle of "joint 
and several liability" of 
defendants in private securities 
cases, the principle of 
"separate and proportionate 
liability." Under the former 
practice, any defendant in a 
securities action could be 
compelled to pay the entire 
amount of a judgment 
regardless of the extent to 
which his conduct contributed 
to the plaintiffs' losses. Under 
a "separate and proportionate 
standard" each defendant 
would only be liable to the 
extent to which his conduct 
causes the losses. The Board's 
support, expressed in 
testimony before a Congres­
sional committee considering 
the matter, was the conse­
quence of a careful study of the 
matter which concluded that 
the "joint and several" practice 
imposed significant unfairness 
on defendants in securities 
litigation. Late in 1995 
Congress overrode the 
President's veto of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform 
Act which included a provision
for "separate and proportion­
ate liability" in most cases 
among defendants in securities 
cases.
It is too soon to judge the 
impact of this new law on the 
liability of auditor defendants. 
However, there are some 
indications that fewer cases are 
being filed against auditors, 
although this may be for 
reasons other than the new 
legislation.
Board  Me e t i n g s
The Board and its staff held 
seven regularly scheduled 
meetings during the year in 
connection with its oversight 
of the self-regulatory programs 
of the SECPS and its 
consideration of issues having 
a bearing on the credibility and 
effectiveness of the auditor.
The three-day October meeting 
was a "retreat meeting," which 
the Board periodically holds to 
(1) review the effectiveness of 
the self-regulatory programs 
and the Board's oversight role 
and (2) evaluate matters 
relating to the quality of 
independent auditing and 
financial reporting in the U.S. 
At the meeting, the Board 
exchanged views with the 
Comptroller General of the 
U.S. General Accounting 
Office, the Chief Accountant of 
the SEC and an Associate Chief 
Accountant, the chair of the 
SECPS, and the chair and vice­
chair of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 
Guests of the Board at other 
meetings included the 
immediate past AICPA 
president, the current AICPA 
president, the vice-chair of the
AICPA, the Chief Accountant 
of the SEC, the chair of the 
Financial Accounting 
Foundation, the chair of the 
SECPS Executive Committee, 
the chair of the AICPA Special 
Committee on Assurance 
Services, the chair of the 
Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee, the AICPA Vice 
President-Self-Regulation, and 
the senior QCIC staff person. 
Those present at the retreat 
meeting and other meetings 
urged the Board to continue to 
view its role broadly. As one 
participant observed, the 
Board has appropriately 
assumed the role of "creative 
irritant" to the auditing 
profession and encouraged the 
Board to continue that role.
In addition to exchanging 
views with those present at 
formal POB meetings, the 
Board's chairman, other Board 
members and the Executive 
Director and staff interacted 
with SEC Chairman Levitt and 
the Chief Accountant on a 
number of occasions on the 
subject of auditor indepen­
dence as well as with the 
SECPS Executive Committee 
chair and chair of the SECPS 
Task Force on Auditor 
Independence; the AICPA 
president concerning the 
allocation of resources to 
support the self-regulatory 
programs, particularly the 
Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee; the Auditing 
Standards Board on the subject 
of the proposed auditing 
standard, Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit; 
and with representatives of the
accounting profession in the 
U.K. on the subject of 
establishing a public oversight 
board in the U.K.
The chairman of the POB 
addressed the spring meeting 
of the AICPA Council and 
discussed POB activities with 
the AICPA board of directors.
The Board's staff 
participated in the delibera­
tions of SECPS task forces on 
Auditor Independence, Quality 
Control Standards, Implemen­
tation of and Transition to 
Revised Quality Control 
Standards, Best Practices, 
Oversight in the Year 2000, and 
Technology.
The J ohn  J. Mc C l o y  
Awa r d
The POB awarded the 1996 
John J. McCloy Award for 
Outstanding Contributions to 
Audit Excellence to David B. 
Pearson whose career has been 
characterized by his leadership 
and commitment to improving 
the quality of the accounting 
profession's self-regulatory 
programs. He has unfailingly 
placed the public interest in the 
forefront as a member, then 
chair, of the SECPS Peer 
Review Committee and as an 
engagement partner of several 
large firm peer reviews. In 
these activities and in 
contributing to the auditing 
standard setting process and to 
the improvement of the quality 
of university and continuing 
education, Mr. Pearson's views 
have always been shaped by 
the importance of maintaining 
public confidence in the 
profession.
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O v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e S E C P S E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e
One or more Board members and staff members attend each meeting of the SECPS 
Executive Committee and its Planning Committee and participate as appropriate. The 
Executive Committee is the SECPS's governing body. It establishes the Section's 
membership requirements and supervises the activities of the Peer Review Committee 
("PRC"), the Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC"), the SEC Regulations Committee, 
and the Professional Issues Task Force ("PITF").
The PITF was formed in 1994 
in response to a Board 
recommendation to identify 
and consider practice issues 
that present high audit risk 
and to disseminate relevant 
guidance. During the year, the 
PITF issued three Practice 
Alerts entitled "Complex
Derivatives," "Auditing Related 
Parties and Related-Party 
Transactions," and "The Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995."
The SECPS completed its 
monitoring of compliance with 
the requirement that AICPA 
members that practice before 
the SEC be enrolled in the 
SECPS. With assistance from
the SEC Chief Accountant's 
staff, an Executive Committee 
task force is conducting an 
outreach program to identify 
and invite other firms that are 
not members of the SECPS but 
audit SEC clients to join the 
SECPS.
The SECPS chair wrote to 
all SECPS firms advising them 
that applicable membership 
requirements, including 
concurring review and partner 
rotation, are applicable to 
engagements for which a 
member serves as principal 
auditor of record of an 
employee stock purchase, 
savings or similar plan that 
files a Form 11-K with the SEC
pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.
The Executive Committee 
approved a Memorandum of 
Understanding prepared by the 
QCIC which codified the 
unwritten understanding that 
had guided the SEC staff's 
access to information about 
closed QCIC cases. This 
memorandum was transmitted 
to the Office of the Chief 
Accountant.
Major Corrective 
Measures Imposed by 
the Peer Review 
Committee to Ensure 
that Quality Control 
Deficiencies 
are Corrected
Number o f Times
During Since
Action 1995-96 Inception
Accelerated peer review 1 5 2
Employment of an outside consultant acceptable 
to the Peer Review Committee to perform 
preissuance reviews of financial statements or 
other specified procedures 8 7 4
Revisits by the peer reviewers or visits by a 
committee member to ascertain progress made 
by the firm in implementing corrective actions 7 1 9 4
Review of the planning for and results of the 
firm's internal inspection program 2 5 3 0 4
Review of changes made to the firm's quality 
control document or other manuals and checklists 1 4 3
Continuing Professional Education in specified areas 3 * 4 2
* Since July 1 ,  1988.
O v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e
P e e r R e v i e w P r o c e s s
A primary responsibility of the Board is to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Section's peer review process, including the activities of its Peer Review Committee. Peer 
review is an independent, rigorous evaluation of the design of a firm's quality control 
system for its accounting and auditing practice, and an assessment of a firm's compliance 
with that system. It is the cornerstone of the CPA profession's self-regulatory program and 
its principal method of assuring the public that member firms are performing at a level 
that meets or exceeds professional standards. Because of the significance and magnitude 
of the peer review process, the Board and its staff allocate substantial resources to the 
oversight of the peer review process to assure that it is vigorous and effective.
One or more Board members 
and staff members regularly 
attend and participate 
proactively in meetings of the 
PRC. The Board's staff reports 
to the Board at each of its 
meetings on the performance 
of the committee in setting 
standards, processing reports, 
following-up on mandated 
corrective actions, and dealing 
with substandard performance 
of individual peer review 
teams.
Every peer review 
administered by the committee 
is monitored by the Board's 
staff. The level of oversight 
varies in intensity according to 
the characteristics of reviewed 
firms and the past performance 
history of reviewed firms and 
review teams. In 1995-96, the 
Board's staff attended the 
reviews of approximately 25% 
of firms with SEC clients, 
including 100% of firms with 
thirty or more SEC clients, for 
the purpose of testing 
compliance with the peer 
review standards. Firms with
SEC clients that received a 
qualified or adverse opinion 
on their prior review were 
visited with greater frequency 
than others. For all other firms 
with SEC clients, the staff 
reviewed selected working 
papers and the reports, letters 
of comments and response and 
discussed significant issues 
identified with peer reviewers 
to satisfy itself that all such 
issues were properly resolved 
and reported. The staff 
participated in all the meetings 
of task forces of the PRC 
regarding evaluation of 
individual peer reviews and 
communicated any concerns it 
had about the conduct of or 
reporting on reviews. The staff 
is satisfied that all such 
concerns were adequately 
considered by the PRC.
The Board's staff monitored 
the activities of task forces of 
the PRC. One such task force 
was the Task Force on 
Associations of CPA Firms. An 
association of CPA firms is a 
group of firms that join 
together to achieve a variety of 
objectives. These may include 
pooling resources to enhance
their ability to (a) render 
professional services—for 
example, through joint 
education programs, inter-firm 
consultation, and peer 
review—and (b) market such 
services. Present guidelines 
proscribe associations that 
administer peer reviews of its 
member firms from warranting 
or making representations 
regarding the quality of 
professional services 
performed by member firms or 
conducting marketing efforts 
on behalf of members. The task 
force concluded and the PRC 
concurred that the perfor­
mance of certain marketing 
activities on behalf of member 
firms should continue to be 
regarded as a violation of the 
independence requirements in 
the SECPS's Guidelines for 
Involvement by Associations of 
CPA Firms if the association 
arranges for and carries out 
peer reviews of its own 
members.
The PRC's Oversight in the 
Year 2000 Task Force is close to 
completing its efforts and 
expects to issue a report in 
1997. Its recommendations are 
intended to assure that the 
peer review process continues 
to be relevant and results in 
continuous improvement in 
the quality of member firms' 
audit practices.
The Board's staff 
participated, with the AICPA 
Joint Task Force on Quality 
Control Standards, in the 
drafting of the Guide for
Establishing and Maintaining 
Quality Control for a CPA Firm's 
Accounting and Auditing 
Practice. This guide contains 
recommendations to assist CPA 
firms in implementing revised 
Quality Control Standards.
While improving the 
quality of audits of individual 
member firms continues to be 
the primary focus of peer 
review, the PRC believes that 
the program should be a 
source of information to the 
standard-setters to assure that 
quality control and auditing 
standards are relevant and 
effective in assuring that firms 
are prepared to deal with 
emerging practice issues in 
their individual practices. 
Consequently, the PRC referred 
a number of such issues to 
standard-setters, which 
described the issues for 
practitioners, principally in 
Audit Risk Alerts.
It is the Board's conclusion, 
based on its oversight 
program, that the SECPS peer 
review program contributes to 
the quality and consistency of 
auditing in the United States.
The SEC, through the office 
of the Chief Accountant, 
oversees the peer review 
process and POB oversight of 
the process by randomly 
inspecting peer review 
working papers and POB files. 
The SEC's inspection of the 
1995 reviews is complete and 
the Board expects the SEC to 
continue to endorse the 
SECPS's Peer Review Program 
in its 1996 annual report.
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee determines whether allegations of audit failure 
against SECPS member firms involving SEC registrants indicate a need for those firms to 
take corrective actions to strengthen their quality control systems or to address personnel 
deficiencies. The quality control inquiry process complements the peer review process.
The committee's work also on 
occasion raises questions that 
suggest the need to reconsider 
or interpret professional 
standards or suggest audit 
practice issues where practical 
guidance would benefit 
practitioners. The QCIC refers 
such matters to the PITF or 
other bodies responsible for 
issuing professional guidance.
Section member firms are 
required to report and provide 
to the QCIC copies of 
complaints and amendments 
of complaints within 30 days 
of being served. This 
requirement includes all 
litigation involving the firm or 
its personnel, or any publicly 
announced investigation by a 
regulatory agency, that alleges 
deficiencies in the conduct of 
an audit of an SEC registrant. 
The QCIC also has the 
authority to inquire into 
complaints involving non­
public entities where there is 
significant public interest and 
also into complaints filed 
against auditors by federal and 
state regulators alleging audit 
failure in the conduct of an 
audit of a financial institution.
The QCIC reviews the 
complaints, financial 
statements and regulatory 
filings, trustee reports, SEC 
enforcement releases, and 
other publicly available 
documents. If the committee's 
preliminary analysis indicates 
that the complaint is not 
frivolous, the QCIC meets with 
representatives of the accused 
firm. The QCIC also may 
review audit documentation 
and firm guidance material for 
the purpose of determining 
whether the allegations against 
the firm indicate a need for the 
firm to strengthen quality
controls or issue additional 
internal guidance. The QCIC 
reviewed firm technical 
guidance material and/or 
audit documentation related to 
the allegations in eight (8) 
cases during this past year. The 
QCIC occasionally becomes 
aware of behavior by 
individual CPAs that warrants 
investigation. The QCIC refers 
such matters to the AICPA 
Professional Ethics Division. In 
rare cases, the QCIC becomes 
aware of regulatory rules that, 
if amended, would better 
protect the public interest. In 
such cases, appropriate 
regulatory agencies are so 
informed.
The Board and its staff 
monitor and evaluate the 
effectiveness of all QCIC
activities. All committee and 
task force meetings are 
attended by the Board and/or 
its staff and the Board has 
unrestricted access to all 
committee deliberations and 
files. During the 1995-96 year, 
the Board's staff participated in 
all 35 QCIC task force meetings 
at which QCIC members and 
AICPA staff discussed the 
allegations contained in 
specific cases with representa­
tives of the firms reporting the 
litigation. The Board's staff 
prepares comprehensive 
reports on individual cases for 
the Board's information and 
responds to Board inquiries 
about the process. The Board 
and its staff are also actively 
involved in the identification 
and communication of areas 
where professional standards 
should be augmented.
The Board believes that the 
QCIC process effectively 
complements the peer review 
process and that appropriate 
consideration was given to the 
46 cases closed during the year.
The SEC staff actively 
oversees the QCIC process and 
the attendant POB activities. 
The SEC staff visited the POB's 
offices several times during the 
year to review the QCIC 
prepared closed case 
summaries and the POB files 
on each case, which include 
POB memoranda on task force 
meetings.
During the past year, the 
QCIC experienced delays in 
the consideration and 
processing of cases. These 
delays primarily resulted from 
the departure of experienced 
QCIC staff who were 
responsible for analyzing 
complaints and related 
financial statements, preparing 
staff summaries and schedules, 
and participating in task force 
meetings. In the fall of 1996, 
the Section hired two senior 
staff persons and substantial 
progress has been made in 
eliminating the backlog of 
open cases.
QCIC
Activity
7 /1 /95
through
6/30/96
11/1/79
through
6/30/95 Totals
Actions R elated  to Firms
Either a special review was made, the firm's 
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded, 
or other relevant work was inspected 3 62 65
A firm took appropriate corrective measures that 
were responsive to the implications of the specific case 8 97 105
Actions R elated  to Standards
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked 
to consider the need for changes in, or guidance 
on, professional standards 4 5 4 5
The Professional Issues Task Force was asked to 
consider the issuance of a practice alert 5 7 12
Actions R elated  to Individuals
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional 
Ethics Division with a recommendation for 
investigation into the work of specific individuals 2 8 2 8
16 2 3 9 2 5 5
(Note: Frequently more than one action is taken by the QCIC or by the firm on an individual case.)
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O v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e
Qu a l i t y  Co n t r o l  I n q u i r y  Co m m i t t e e
P OB
Co m m e n t a r y
Fr a u d  De t e c t i o n
In the Board's 1993 Special Report, In the Public Interest, the Board observed:
"No problem confronting the profession is as demanding or as difficult to resolve, as the 
problem of management fraud and its detection by auditors. Before the turn of the century 
both auditors and users of audited financial information regarded the detection of fraud 
as one of the primary purposes of an audit. For many reasons the profession has moved 
from acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in detecting fraud is secondary to 
the other purposes of audits. In contrast, the public has continued to regard fraud 
detection as an important goal of the audit process— and now attaches even greater 
importance to that goal."
"The Board believes that, to a greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept 
responsibility for the detection of fraud by management. The profession cannot, and it 
cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every fraud, no matter how 
cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit, but it must develop means 
of increasing significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud."
"The Board also recommends that the profession develop comprehensive guidelines to 
further assist auditors in identifying symptoms that indicate the heightened likelihood of 
management fraud involving the manipulation of financial information and specify 
additional audit procedures when such symptoms appear. This undertaking should be 
broad in scope and include the development of guidance to facilitate the analysis of both 
financial data and non-financial factors that may be indicative of management fraud."
The Auditing Standards Board 
("ASB") is in the final stages of 
developing improved guidance 
of the nature that the Board 
suggested in its Special Report. 
The Board has carefully 
followed and provided 
comment on the ASB's 
proposed standard Consider­
ation of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit and believes 
that it clarifies the auditor's 
responsibility to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting 
and will substantially assist the 
auditor in meeting that 
responsibility by including risk 
factors identified by research 
of past frauds, and explaining 
how the auditor should assess, 
document and respond to 
those risk factors.
The ASB has done its job 
well and it will now be the 
responsibility of auditing firms 
to implement the new standard 
by revising their quality 
control systems, educating 
their personnel, and 
conducting their audits with 
heightened and experienced 
skepticism. As many firms are 
now "reengineering" their 
audit approaches for other
reasons, this will be both a 
challenge and an opportunity.
A u d i t o r  I n d e p e n d e n c e
Since the inception of the 
Public Oversight Board, no 
topic has been the subject of 
more Board discussion than 
the subject of auditor 
independence. In 1979, the 
Board undertook a review of 
non-audit services performed 
by auditors of publicly held 
companies, concluded that 
some services were 
incompatible with perceptions 
of independence, and 
counseled the profession to 
undertake new non-audit 
activities with caution and 
circumspection. A Board 
sponsored survey of public 
perceptions about non-audit 
services conducted in 1986 
found considerable misgivings 
among knowledgeable groups 
about the performance of 
certain services for audit 
clients. More recently, in 1993 
the Board published In the 
Public Interest which reiterated 
the Board's strongly held belief
about the importance of the 
audit function in multi-line 
service firms and the need to 
enhance the perception of 
auditor independence in 
assuring the credibility of 
financial reporting. In 1994, in 
response to concerns expressed 
by the then SEC Chief 
Accountant about auditor 
independence, the Board 
formed an Advisory Panel on 
Auditor Independence. The 
Panel's report was referred to 
above.
In 1995 and 1996, a number 
of matters led the Board to 
conclude that the time had 
come for the profession to 
reevaluate the adequacy of the 
profession's Code of 
Professional Conduct to deal 
with present day indepen­
dence questions. In a 
December 2 7 , 1995 letter to 
officials of the American 
Institute of CPAs and the SEC 
Practice Section, we urged that 
"it is timely and appropriate 
for the profession to consider 
whether the Code of 
Professional Conduct provides 
an adequate framework and 
guidance for addressing in a 
timely manner the implications 
of new service lines."
As a result of the Board's 
letter, the chair of the Executive 
Committee formed the Task 
Force on Auditors' Indepen­
dence When Performing Non- 
Audit Services for an Attest 
Client. This task force has held 
a number of meetings to 
address a number of 
conceptual issues concerning 
the nature of services that CPA 
firms may render directly, or 
indirectly through related 
entities, for their SEC 
registrant audit clients. The 
Board's staff has participated 
in all the meetings of this task 
force. Staff of the Office of the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC 
has also participated in the 
meetings. The task force's 
work is ongoing at the date of 
this report and many of the 
issues under discussion are 
contentious and consensus has 
not yet been reached.
The Board is encouraged by 
the substantive attention that is 
being given to the issues being 
discussed by the task force and 
the professionalism of the 
deliberations. However, the 
proliferation of non-audit 
services continues to grow, and 
the character of some services 
underlying this growth have 
evolved away from being of an 
advisory nature. For example, 
firms now provide outsourcing 
arrangements for many 
corporate functions. The 
implications of some of the 
new services on auditor 
independence are difficult to 
assess; and thus they result in 
skepticism by many observers 
of the profession about auditor 
objectivity. Because the root 
causes of skepticism about 
independence are not well 
understood, efforts to deal 
with scope of service issues 
through rules and other 
measures have not been 
effective in addressing that 
skepticism. As non-audit 
services continue to grow, that 
growth must be fostered in a 
manner that avoids providing 
services to audit clients that 
undercut the perception of 
auditor independence. Thus, 
we believe that public 
perceptions about auditor 
independence need to be better 
understood and that non-audit 
services provided to public 
companies need to be 
measured against a more 
conceptually sound 
independence framework than 
currently exists. It may be that, 
with better understanding of 
public perceptions and a more 
consistent conceptual 
framework, concerns about the 
impact of certain non-audit 
services on auditor indepen­
dence may be mitigated.
The profession must again 
demonstrate its ability to 
succeed in creating institutions 
and procedures commensurate 
with the needs of the times. We 
urge the profession to continue 
its efforts to preserve and 
strengthen self-regulation in 
the accounting profession.
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DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT, AND AUDITORS— 
ALLIES IN PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER 
INTERESTS
What  the Au d i t  C o m m i t t e e
Sh o u l d  Do
The POB urges that audit committees take action to ensure 
that their charter or terms of reference include or provide for 
the following:
■  An instruction to the independent auditor that the board of 
directors, as the shareholders' representative, is the 
auditor's client.
■  An expectation that financial management and the 
independent auditor perform a timely analysis of significant 
financial reporting issues and practices.
■  An expectation that financial management and the 
independent auditor discuss with the audit committee their 
qualitative judgments about the appropriateness, not just 
the acceptability, of accounting principles and financial 
disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the 
company and, particularly, about the degree of aggressive­
ness or conservatism of its accounting principles and 
underlying estimates.
■  An opportunity for the full board of directors to meet with 
the independent auditor annually to help provide a basis for 
the board to recommend to shareholders the appointment of 
the auditor or ratification of the board's selection of the 
auditor.
The audit committee discussion with the independent auditor 
about the appropriateness of accounting principles and 
financial disclosure practices should generally include the 
following:
■  the auditor's independent qualitative judgments about the 
appropriateness, not just the acceptability, of the accounting 
principles and the clarity of the financial disclosure practices 
used or proposed to be adopted by the company;
■  the auditor's views about whether management's choices of 
accounting principles are conservative, moderate, or 
extreme from the perspective of income, asset, and liability 
recognition, and whether those principles are common 
practices or are minority practices;
■  the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness 
of changes in accounting principles and disclosure practices;
■  the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness 
of the accounting principles and disclosure practices 
adopted by management for new transactions or events;
■  the auditor's reasoning in accepting or questioning 
significant estimates made by management;
■  the auditor's views about how the company's choices of 
accounting principles and disclosure practices may affect 
shareholders and public views and attitudes about the 
company.
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